One of t he most widely debated issues in comparative political econo my today is the globaliza tio n thesis. Taxation is at the cent er o f this deba te. According to t his thesis internat ionalization increases the availability of the exit opt ion acco rded mo bile asset ho lders and this in turn forces policy makers to compete for transnationally fluid investment via tax red uct ions. The result, pro ponent s of t his view arg ue, is that all nat ion states must redesign t heir tax systems -and most probably reduce tax burdens -in order to effectively compete in the new world economy. The result, many argue, will be an erosion of the fiscal capacity of the state which will ultimately undermine the welfare state. As Guttorm Schjelderup has written, The fear is that capital mobility may lead to capital flight from high to low tax countries in such large amou nts tha n it d epr ives a nat ion o f its t ax base and, as a conseq uenc e, it s welfare syst em (Schjelderup 1993: 377). 1 Not all analysts agree however. On the other side of the 'globalization' argument are a group of political economists who emphasize the institutional and political constraints countervailing the international competitive pressures which presumably push all countries towards the bottom. Garrett and Lange, for example, have argued that domestic institutions as well as demands for increased so cial prot ection in the face o f internat ional economic competition mitigate against the pressures to reduce the size of the welfare state (Garrett and Lange 1991; Garrett and Lange 1995: 628-9). Similarly, Fritz Scharpf has written national welfare states differ gre atly in the ir vulnerability to internatio nal ec ono mic pr essu res, and in t he sp ecific
problems which they need most urgently address --and they differ also in the policy options that they could reach under t he path-dependent constraints o f existing policy legacies, and under t he institutional constraints of existing veto positions. (Scharpf 2000: 224) . 2 The following analysis aims to enter this debate through an examination of the political economy of taxation in Sweden. Sweden provides and excellent case to study this New Political Economy of Taxation for several reasons. First, Sweden is one of the most heavily taxed countries in the world. Second, Sweden has long been a relatively open economy. Third, Swede s have long been not ed for (and pr oud o f) their commitment t o a bro adly redistributive welfare state.
3 Finally, ear ly in this decade (19 91) Swe den introduced a massive tax reform that it dubbed The Tax Reform o f the Cent ury which was widely held up to be, the most far-reaching tax reform in any western industrialized country (Agell, Englund, and Södersten 1996: 643 ).
This reform not only followed the general pattern of tax reform witnessed in a wide variety of count ries in the 19 80's and 199 0's ( cf. P echma n 1988; Sandford 1 993 ; Tanzi 19 95) , but actually went furt her in reduc ing mar ginal t ax rates and br oadening the t ax base t han similar r eforms in many other countries.
This case study, then, offers a test of the Globalization thesis in terms of its expectations for what should happen to tax policy in the face of globalization and provides a more subtle analysis of the actual changes in tax policy which act ually have been implemented in recent years.
To preview our findings a bit: First, I find on the one hand that the fear t hat globalization should create an End of the State to be grossly overstated. This does not mean, however, that we find no changes in tax policies in Sweden. Indeed, the evidence sugg ests t hat Sweden, and even more broadly, The Swedish Model has changed quite dramatically since it was first heralded as The Middle Way between free market capitalism and state dominated socialism.
Tax policy is most certainly adapting to the new political economic realities at centuries end.
Interestingly, however, this case st udy evidence suggests neit her The End of Redist ribution (Steinmo 1994) nor that There Is No Alternat ive (TIN A) as Mrs. Thatcher was so often fond of saying. Instead, it appears that the Swedes are continuing their historical pattern of manipulating so me kind of middle ground between the rampant liberalism of free markets, and controlled markets in the hands of a large and powerful state. Swedish tax policy is adapting to the realities of the New Political Economy, but the Swedish welfare state is not dying because of it.
The Old Political Economy of Taxation in Sweden
Sweden has long been noted, ad mired and loathed as the premier example of a high t ax high spend Social Democratic State. With a Socialist party in office for all but 9 years since 1932, this country has developed a highly redistributive and very expensive social welfare system that, to the surprise of many, has been remarkably economically effective for most of this period. 4 This Swedish Model depended rather fundamentally on a particular tax regime that on the one hand, taxed perso nal income, co nsumption and wealth very heavily. But on t he other hand, capital and corporate income was remarkably little taxed in comparative perspective. This seemingly curious outcome (a Left dominated polity with highly redistributive policy ambitions constructing a tax syst em that taxed la bor income mor e hea vily tha n cap ital and c orporat e inco me) c an explaine d in two different ways. First , there was specific Historic Compr omise over t ax policy between the Social Democrats and big employers over how far labor would press its anti-capitalist ambitions.
Second, throughout the post-war period a huge number of specific tax incentives were introduced which slashed effect ive tax rates paid by c orporat ions who invested in t he Swedish econo my (Norr, Duffy, and Sterner 1959) .
Though marginal tax rates were quite high, Swedish Ministry of Finance officials had become very accomplished in creating tax expenditures designed to direct investment to particular sectors of the economy, promote employment, and/or encourage investment (or build up stock reserves) during economic downturns (Hansen 1969) . 5 The effects of these multiple and very deep tax incentives was that large Swedish corporations paid only nominal taxes on corporate profits.
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While large corporations and wealthy capitalists paid relatively low taxes (as long as they kept their capital in productive assets in Sweden) smaller, privately held firms and ordinary workers paid extraordinarily heavy tax burdens. 7 Tho ugh rar ely publicly st ated, the explic it corporate tax policy goal of the Social Democratic governments in the post-war years was to squeeze capital into t he lar ge, internatio nally co mpet itive manufa cturing indu str ies. At t he sa me time, Sweden maintained an open international t rade policy which was explicitly aimed at forcing Swe dish fir ms to maintain int ernational comp etitiveness. These firms were , of cours e, p rec isely the firms dominated by LO unions, (Sweden s large centralized union organization) and were also the same firms ha d by no w developed a working re lationship with So cial Democ rat s in classic corporatist arrangements.
Tax po licy was thus fundamentally intertwined with what was widely kno wn as The Swedish Model. In this model, personal income and consumption was very heavily taxed, where as capital income and profits were taxed quite lightly. This system was specifically designed to help concentrate capital and labor resources into Sweden's large internationally competitive manufa cturing sector (Elvander 1 972 ; Rodrig uez 198 0; Steinmo 1993 ) . These ind ust ries, it
should not go without notice, were also those most heavily represented at the elite levels of both the Swedish Employer's Federation (SAF) and Sweden's largest union confederation (LO) (Rothstein and Bergström 1999; Swenson 1989 ).
The post-war compromise in Sweden can be represented as a deal between labor, capital and the Social Democratic government in which capital would not only be allowed to coexist even while Socialists were in power (Pontussen 1986 ), but the Socialists and their labor union allies would conduct wage strategies 8 and tax policies that would explicitly favor corporate capital (St einmo 198 8). The ot her side of t his co rpo rat ist deal was tha t big unio ns and a big sta te would also be toler ated, emplo yment would be held a t ve ry high levels, and when ec ono mic change was called for, the individual worker and his family would be fully compensated for econo mic costs of struct ural transfor mation (Swenso n 1989) . Specific policies favor ing unions were also introduced 9 and wide variety of public insurance, education, and welfare programs were established and expanded (Rothstein 1988) .
It is in this context that one must appreciate the extent to which Swedish eco nomic and policy elites became increasingly confident of their ability to manage the economy towards high growth, high per capita GDP, and a relatively egalitarian distribution of income. They were, perhaps quite justifiably, very proud of themselves and very confident of their abilities to manage capitalist development. 10 By virtually all accounts, the system worked. By the 1970s Sweden had beco me one of the richest co untries in the wo rld and had done t his while building one of the most egalitarian society in the western world (Palme 1993) . Swede s were unmistakably proud of this fact and admired themselves fo r having achieved very high levels of economic growth and high levels of economic justice (Heclo and Madsen 1987) .
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In su m, by many accounts Swe den had achieved t he best o f many wo rlds by the mid 1970s: This small country in the nort h of Eur ope had one o f the most egalitar ian systems in the world, had e ssentially eliminat ed p ove rty, and ed ucated one o f the most dynamic , and flexible workforces found in any capitalist economy. At the same time the economy was quite productive, efficient, dynamic and dominated by major internationally competitive firms such as Volvo, ASEA and E riksson. Fina lly, the go vernment was demo cra tic, highly stable, efficiently r un by a well trained and well insulated technocratically oriented elite that possessed an arsenal of policy devises designed to keep the Swedish economy open, competitive and dynamic.
As we shall see below, however, changes in both the international and domestic political eco nomies w ere soon t o br ing abou t a ret hinking o f ta x po licy.
The New Political Economy of Taxation in Sweden

Structural Changes in the Economy
In the 1970's the Swedish economy began a series of important structural changes.
Ironically, some o f the se changes were the dire ct conseq uenc e of the public po licies introduced in the pre viou s decade. For examp le, p ro-union p olicie s dr amat ically increa sed unio n density in Sweden (Rothstein 1992) . Many of these workers where not t raditionally organized by LO unions (who generally represented classical workers ) but were inst ead organized by either t he TCO or by SACO unions. The significance of this change is that while Sweden -which had once been noted for its highly centralized wage negotiation system and unified and disciplined union structure -by the mid 1980s began to see conflicts between export oriented unions and those less subject to 'mar ket discipline ' (Not ermans 2000: 24 -26) . It is far easier to find a common fro nt between the interests of miners and auto workers, for example, than it is to find a common interest between medical doctors and day care employees. At the same time, the expansion of public employment dramatically increased the 'femininization' of t he wor k force. As Diane
Sains bury points out, the increased p art icipatio n of w omen in the wo rkfo rce (mostly in public sector jobs) dramatically increased opportunity structures for women, but the political interests of women were not always coincident with men (Sainsbury 1996) .
As Table 1 indicates, public employment in Sweden expanded very rapidly in the 1960-198 0 pe riod. Whereas public employment in S weden wa s quite clos e to t he OE CD average in 1960, it was nearly double the average in 1980. Ironically, a consequence of many of these changes was the erosion of wo rker solidarit y in Sweden. The growing diver sity of inter ests ( and the consequent splits in political demands on the part of workers generally) had direct consequences for both wage demands and public spending in Sweden. In the old Swedish Model, union wage demands could be tempered by the economic realities of the international marketplace, and decisions once reached at the elite level could be implemented at the local shop floor level due to the high degree of power of the central union organization (Swenson 1991) .
But by the late 1970's and early 80's the Swedish political econo my was quite different. The SAF had abandoned the commitment to national wage deals, in part so that its members could pay higher paid w orkers mor e and hold down wages o f lower paid wor kers ( Moses 2000; Notermans 200 0) . Also, pu blic emp loyee s (w ho have no int ernational mark et discipline t o t emper their demands) were increasingly dominating the wage demand picture. Finally, the union organizations themselves were less able (and probably less willing) to hold wages back so that pro fits c ould be ma intained ( or public so tha t sp ending co uld be held in chec k). Given the se ba sic fact s, S weden qu ickly develo ped str ong inflationary pr oclivities. T he go vernment , de sperat ely trying to maintain Swedish international competitiveness in light of these inflationary pressures, felt that it s only alternative was to periodically devalue the Swedish Kronor (Jonung 1999) .
Table 1 goes about here Government Employment
Concomitant with the changes in the domestic political economy, the world economy was also undergoing changes that potentially had negative implications for traditional Swedish industries. Mining, steel, shipbuilding, autos were each stung by growing competition from especially lower wage Asian economies. It is of course ext remely difficult to disaggregate the inflationary wage pressures specifically facing these industries in Sweden from the more general world wide trend in these industries to lower wage economies. Economists in Sweden came to believe that wage pressures in combination with the growing rigidity of the Swedish labor market resulting from t he various Social Democr atic po licies introduced in t he 19 70's did not help (Calmfors and Göran 1980; Lindbeck 1997; Sverenius 1999:217-224) 12 . For example, it is also widely recognized that though the increasingly frequent (and sometimes quite dramatic) devaluat ions could tempo rarily improve S wedish indust ries inter national price competitive position, these po licies did little to not hing to increase the long term competitiveness of the Swedish economy in anything like the way that the traditional Swedish model might have done.
Implication for Tax Policy
The po litical and struct ural changes discussed abo ve had direct implicatio ns for t he Swedish tax system. First, increasing demands for public programs and increasing wage demands from public employees directly led to the need for higher taxes. The result was that taxes eventually spiraled to over 60% of GDP by 1990. 13 Secondly, the combination of this tax pressure and the related inflationary tendencies in the Swedish economy meant that ever more
Swe dish c itize ns we re being p ushe d up into per sonal inco me tax br ackets whic h wer e originally intended to impact the very richest Swedish taxpayers. 14 In the short run, of course, the Treasury needed this bracket creep because it 'automatically' increased revenues. 15 In the longer run, these officials understood quite clearly that t ax rat es of this magnitude contributed direct ly to the inflat iona ry cyc le gr ipping S wed en in t hese yea rs. In simple t erms, w or ker s (e ven, impo rt ant ly, public sector workers) discounted the extra costs of taxes into their wage demands. As the noted
Swedish economist Lars Calmfors noted in 1977: large groups of wage earners have moved up
into the tax bra ckets w here the pr ogressiveness is so high t hat it is, in fact impossible to obt ain increases in r eal dispo sable incomes t hro ugh increases in nominal wages. .. Suc h a t ax sc heme could also decouple internal wage and external price trends. 16 The table below sho ws the consequence for the costs of Swedish labor.
Table 2 about here-Percentage change in Labor Costs 1970-1995
The Swe dish economic elite bot h wit hin the Ministr y of Fina nce a nd in t he ec ono mic profession more generally saw these developments as a crisis. Whereas in the past these elites believed t hey co uld manage the ir ec ono my quit e effectively, now the y wer e incr easingly convinced that such management was no longer possible. What were once thought of as labor market part ners were becoming simply Interest Groups . In additio n, whereas the political system in the earlier era insulated the fiscal elite and gave them enormous policy auto nomy, now politica l demands o n both t he t ax and spending side were incre asing ly difficult t o shut out. Finally, the interests of capital itself began to change: The Swedish economy moved more towards services and towards production of more highly specialized and sophisticated production strategies, Swedish companies required more flexibility in terms of their investment strategies.
The tradit ional Swedish t ax regime dra matically t ax ad vant aged do mest ic investme nt a nd o penly discouraged foreign investment (but not, of course, foreign trade). By the 1970s Swedish capitalists were already complaining that this incentive system made it difficult for them to invest in lower e nd/skill t echnolo gy abr oad and this in tu rn made it difficult fo r them to fo cus the ir Swe dish invest ment wher e Sw eden had compar ative ad vant age (ie. wher e highly specialized skills were needed.).
The sense of crisis was not ne cessarily shar ed by e ither po liticia ns or avera ge citize ns in Swe den in the 198 0s. To the ext ent tha t t here were p roblems with t he t ax system, for example, it was generally believed that this was because it was not progressive enough (Hadenius 1984; Svallfors 1989 Table 9 ).
Tax Reform Swedish Style
Beginning in the late 1970' s, Swedish economist as well as officials in the Ministry of Finance began to seriously question the long term viability of the tax system that was evolving.
Again, there were several interrelated issues: Most importantly, 1) taxes were driving up wages and thus contributing to the inflationary pressures and thus economic imbalances. And 2) these elites came to believe that tax rates were being pushed so high that even ordinary taxpayers were enga ging in a var iety of no n-produc tive behavior s and /or wo rking in t he under gro und eco nomy simply for the purposes of evading taxes. (Agell, Berg, and Edin 1995; Muten 1988; Myrdal 1982) . The Ministry had a substantial pro blem, however: The majority of Social Democrats in the Riksdag (Parliament) as well as the leadership of the LO did not agree that these were the central issues. Quite t he cont rary, t hey like most Swedish voters, believed t hat the pro blem with the Swedish tax system, quite bluntly, was that the rich and the corporations paid too little in taxes, while the lower and middle classes paid too much (Edlund 1999; Hadenius 1986; Svallfors 1989) .
In a recent interview with Minister of Finance Kjell Olaf Feldt, he recalled it as follows: 18 .... .One of the most import ant issu es I began to work on in the ear ly 70's was to change the Social Democra t s perspective on how we get a just income distrib ution in society. T he negative inheritance I received from my predecessor Gunnar Sträng (Minister of Finance 1953? -1976 ) was a strongly progressive tax system with high marginal taxes. This was supposed to bring abou t a just and equal society. But I eventually ca me to the opinion that it simply didn t work out that way. These taxes created instead a society of wranglers, cheaters, peculiar manipulations, false ambitions and new injustices. It took me at least a decade to get a pa rt of the pa rty to see this. That was a big deal, to change the outlook that had been built up since the 1940' s. That I burned for.
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In pursuit of their ambitions to achieve tax reform, the Ministry of Finance began to commissio n a series o f report s and analyse s examining the effects of ta xat ion o n th e ec ono my, workers willingness to work, leisure time, tax wedges, capital formation, and a wide variety of other economic effects. 20 By the end of the decade the Socialists had passed a series of tax reforms which simplified the tax code, increased consumption taxes and scaled back a series of tax expenditures.
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But it was not until 1991 (after they had been pushed out of office by the voters) that the government was able to pass Tax Reform of the Century. 22 With this reform, Sweden took a huge st ep from a tax system that relied on very high marginal rates and then softened these rates with very deep tax loopholes; to a much broader based tax system in which tax rates were red uced substant ially for all ta xpaye rs and t ax expend itures wer e ra dically scale d bac k. N ot only was the top tax rate on income reduced from over 80% to 50%, 23 but also, the tax system was simplified to the point where over 85% of tax payers no longer submitted a tax return at all. After this reform, the tax code possessed so few tax write-offs that the government would simply send a letter to the taxpayer showing t he amount of income t hey had earned in the year and asked the taxpayer to confirm that they had no extra (not already taxed) income. Since there were so few tax exemptions left in the system, the taxpayer could simply sign the slip and send it back to t he authorities... no further taxes would be due, and no tax refund would usually be issued.
Corporate and capital taxation was also radically reformed. Now all capital income faced a flat 30% rate while deductions were substantially rolled back. 24 The Corporat e Profits Tax was also reformed. The marginal tax r ate was reduced from 57% to 3 0% at the same time that many of the most generous tax expenditures available in the code were now eliminated.
Figure 1 goes here Marginal Tax Rates 1989-1991
When the Swedish tax reform of 1991 was finally introduced by the bourgeois coalition government, many analysts saw this as the beginning of the end of the Swedish Welfare State.
Though tax levels were quite high t o be sure, gone was the public commitment to maint ain a progressive tax system. Moreover, since the tax reform was underfinanced, 25 many analysts assumed that the lost revenues would eventually have to be made up with increases in taxes on lower income earners, or cuts in benefits for lower income earners, or both (cf. Steinmo, 1994) .
These predictions of course fit very well with the End of the Welfare State analyses which became so popular in the mid-1990's. Certainly Sweden, the most glaring example of a lar ge and redistributive welfare state should have to fall considerably in the face of the global pressures for international policy convergence.
The tax reform also contr ibut ed t o t he massive economic crisis which struc k Sw eden in the early 1990' s. It was once again the bourgeois coalition government' s bad timing to come to office at the beginning of a recession (as they did in 1976), but there can be no gainsaying that the policies pursued by these governments (ie. with each party trying to pay off its particular constituency) subs tantially wor sene d Sw eden eco nomic situ ation. The tax reform, for example was underfinance d, in no small part to make it easier for the co alitio n to pass it. At t he sa me time the tax reform dramatically increased a collapse in the real property market. 26 Unemployment increased t o double dig its w hereas unemp loyment ha d never before g one ove r four p erc ent in post-war history.
These factors then contributed to a massive increase in public spending despite the fact that the bourgeo is government was at the helm. This go vernment fo und itself incapable of cut ting housing support, child payments, social welfare payments, sickness benefits or any other major social program in the context of an economic decline of this magnitude. 27 The result was that the budget deficit increased t o 13% of GDP. At o ne point internat ional confidence in the kr onor sunk so lo w that the cent ral bank w as fo rce d to increa se t he o vernight lending ra te to 500 % in a vain effort to pro tect the currency. By 1992, then, it was widely predicted that bot h the Swedish
Model and the Swedish economy were on their deathbeds.
Of course the most dire predictions did not come to fruition (at least not yet). The Social
Demo cra tic Par ty returned t o o ffice in 1 994 . Sweden s uno fficial Par ty o f Government quickly set about restabilizing Sweden s financial picture. At first it appeared that the Socialists had accepted the basic TINA logic as they began cutting back several social welfare policies. But careful analysis of these policies suggests that rather t han slash programs wholesale, most of these reductions were in fact designed to make them a bit more fiscally reasonable and remove some of the opportunities for abuse that had been created earlier by the stunning generosity of these policies.
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But the new government did not appear to accept the idea that it must only cut welfare for the poor. Following earlier commitments, 29 the government initiated several studies which tried to examine the dis tribut ive co nseq uenc es o f the 199 1 tax reform onc e the behavio ral c hanges it created had been considered. These studies revealed that the Tax Reform of the Century was negatively redistributive. Armed with this evidence the Social Democratic government which returned t o office in 1995 increased the top marginal rate of tax on very high income earners by 5% and also reduced the Value Added Tax on food by 50%. Since then the government has been trying to effectively hold the line and reestablish fiscal balance. The results of their efforts can be seen below (taxes, particularly on capital income, have increased rather than declined in the 1990's). Not only has financial balance been returned (indeed, just as in the United States after Clinton s incr ease in taxes on t he very we althy) bu t no w Sw eden app ear s to be benefit ting from a substantial economic resurgence at the same time that it is generating quite substantial budget surpluses. (Lindbeck 1997 ).
Certainly as a consequence of this basic fact, Sweden seemed to defy Down s prediction that Government would be too small in a democracy (Downs 1960) . In fact, clear majorities of Swedish citizens clearly believed that they got much for their tax dollar and as a consequence there was ver y little public pressure to cut t axes even t hough t ax burdens were so high (E dlund 1999; Hadenius 1986; Svallfors 1989; Svallfors 1997a ).
Table 4 goes about here Public Attitudes Towards Taxation and Spending
and Beyond
Sweden s economic and fiscal picture has improved markedly in recent years. The first budget introduced in the 21 st century predicted economic growth and budget surpluses extending for the next several years (see T able 5). Perhap s more importantly, it was heralded (and denounced by the right) as A Classic Social Democratic Budget (Gothenburg Post, 4-14-2000) .
To the sur prise of many, the cur rent bu dge t su rplu ses have not been used to cut taxes o n mobile capital as has been demanded by the right and by many business interests. Contrary to those who predict ed that the end of the Redistribut ive Stat e was at hand just a few years ago, the government has chosen to increase public spending on child support yet again and to continue using the surplus to paying off Sweden s public debt. Clearly, the Social Democrats are not behaving in ways that neatly fit the convergence hypothesis.
Table 5 goes about here The Government's Predictions
In sum, it appears that the Social Democrats have not g iven up their progressive ambitions. Contrary to many predictions on the Left (and to the clear disappointment of others) the SAP has decided not to use the budget surplus which it now benefits from in order to cut taxes on mobile capital. Instead, they have decided to use these revenues to add more aid to those at the bottom of the income scale. Almost certainly, future budget surpluses will be used to reduce taxes on particularly dynamic sectors of the economy, subsidize families, and continue to 
Taxation in the New Political Economy
In the crisis period of the 1930' s and 1940's it was quite common to here from both pundits and scholars that capitalism had come to a crossroads: Either economic change or political demands (or both) had brought about a transformation of capitalism as it had been known. Looking back, however, one could instead argue that it was the very policies developed in these decades that effectively saved capitalism. Instead of destroying capitalism, the very welfare st ate t hat many believed would und ermine its key mechanism, had the opposite effects, by red istr ibut ing we alth and dampening the vicious swings of t he free marke t, sta te policy effectively increased aggregate demand and redu ced uncertainty. The results --co ntra the pr edictions of the ideological right --was t hat Sweden experienced a virtuous cycle of gro wth, productivity, and increasing prosperity.
But globalization, it was widely predict ed, would pu t an end to t he Swedish 'miracle.'
Now that the exit optio n is far more re adily available, sure ly capital and high end labo r will exit not only Sweden but all high tax political economies (Tanzi, 1995:65-6; Schjelderup, 1993:377; Lee and McKenzie, 1989) . The consequence, was to be a hollowing out of the welfare state and/or a massive retreat from the redistributive goals of (especially) Social Democratic nations.
The evide nce p resent ed he re sugg est s that the se pred ictions are wro ng. The multiple changes we are seeing in the continued evolution of modern capitalism does impact tax policy makers, just as t he cont inued evolution o f the welfare state pr ograms has enormous implicat ions for po licy makers in each o f these sp ecific arenas. These changes, however, do not spell the end of the welfare state any more than changes earlier in the century spelled the end of capitalism.
This study reveals that a country like Sweden (again, one which was supposed to be the most vulnerable to these global competitive pressures) can prosper in a global economy and maintain its basic commitments to a relatively egalitarian community. (See Tables 6 and 7)   Table 7 HereIn short, the multiple equilibriums observed in the later part of the 20 th century have been upset. This does not suggest, however, that a new single equilibrium is imminent. Quite the contrary, institutional variation will once again structure how different nations respond to eco nomic changes (cf. Steinmo 199 3) a nd as a re sult new ye t st ill multip le equilibriu m should continue to be the most likely result.
Taxation and the Globalization Thesis Revisited
The keystone of the Globalization thesis is the argument that capital will leave countries with highe r tax rates simp ly because the y can g et a bet ter rate of ret urn on t heir invested capital in countries with lower tax rates. This argument does indeed make intuitive sense: After all, even political economists can be smart enough to 'shop around' for CD' s that offer higher rates of return. Surely as the transaction costs of international investment decline, so will investors pro pens ity t o 'shop aro und.' But as t he example not ed he re is meant to illust rat e, invest ments in CD's is not the same as investment in countries. There are a huge number of factors the influence the rate o f return on invest ments in country x or co untry y which can be far mor e import ant to the investor than tax rates. It would be wrong to suggest that investors and potential employers are unconcerned with taxes, but survey evidence as well as over 50 interviews with corporate executives in the US and Europe conducted by this author all suggest that wage rates, quality of workforce, access to markets, quality of infrastructure, political stability and a host of other fact or s ar e ge ner ally more important factors used when deciding where to invest new capital (ie.
whether to 'exit' or 'enter '). As several students who have examined location decisions within the US have d isco vered, the re c an be adva nta ges to being near compet ito rs, sou rce s of highly educated labo r, and suppliers which far outweigh the co sts o f being in cost areas (Dever eaux and Griffith 1998; Hines 1993). Moreover, these factors can be positively affected by high taxes.
Swe den c urr ent ly appear s to offer an examp le of some of t he ad vant ages of a high t ax system:
One in which the cost extracted by the state on employers, workers and consumers alike are indee d higher t han in o the r co mpet itive nat ions but one in which the advant ages may st ill outweigh the costs. (Lindbeck 1997: 92) Stat e and Commu ne ad min istr ation 2 32 55 11 -56 *Housing support (bostadsbidrag) is a direct support to people of lower incomes to help them pay their housing costs in private residen ces. **Social Help (Socialbidrag) is a dir ect payment to low income individuals. Source: (Svallfors 1989: 53) Source: (Agell, Englund, and Södersten 1996: Figure 1) 1.This debate and these arguments have become quite common in the public literature and are thus sometimes discounted (Korten 1995) . But various versions of these arguments have been offered and are taken very seriously also by some o f the wo rld's leading political scient ists and economists as well. See for example: (Genschel, 1999; Lee & McKenzie, 1989; OECD, 1997; Pechman, 1987; Rodrik, 1997; Sandford, 1993; Tanzi, 1995) 2.See for example, (Garrett and Mitchell 1996; McKenzie 1989; Rodrik 1997; Swank 1998) 3.Public opinion polls indicate a continued commitment to specifically redistributive policies that has remained largely constant over the past two decades. (Svallfors 1997b) . Even attitudes specifically focused on taxation have not changed appreciably in recent years. (Edlund 1999) .
4.T here is t oday a large deba te ove r whether Swe den a ctually ha s had a successful eco nomic performance of the past several decades. See note 13 below.
5.A Harvard report on tax policy in Sweden in the late fifties, for example, glowingly reported that this country had an arsenal of revenue devises unmatched elsewhere in the world (Norr, Duffy, and Sterner 1959) . Assar Lindbeck, certainly the most influential and powerful economist in Sweden since Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1970, for example, One can look in any elementary economics textbook today and see that we have the possibility through monetary and fiscal policy to maintain total demand in the economy exactly at any point that we wish (Lindbeck 1970: 20) .
6.It was widely understood that companies had many more tax write-offs available to them than they generally too k advant age of. However, due to their need t o rep ort at least some profits and pay some dividends to stockholders, corporations rarely took advantage of what was available to them. Knowing this, tax authorities almost never audited corporations, for they too understood
Endnotes:
that the companies were paying higher taxes than they had to. See Steinmo 1993: 120-126. 7.For small privately held firms and self employed individuals, the intersection of income tax rates over 80%, steep wealth taxes, and heavy mandatory social insurance charges meant that total taxes could exceed 100% of annual income.
8.T his wa s called t he Solidar istic Wage Policy in which LO u nions would ho ld do wn wa ges in the most productive/profitable sectors (large firms, manufacturing, mining etc.) and push up relative wages in the less productive/profitable sectors (textiles, farming, small firms). The idea was to enco urage structur al modernization and change in the economy by literally increasing profits in some sectors while driving other companies and sectors out of business.
9.Mo st impor tantly, the Ghent unemplo yment insurance was established which effectively gave the unions cont rol over unemplo yment insurance (cf. Rothstein 1992) . But o ther pro-union public policies were also set up and certainly the anti-union incentives co mmon thro ughout the capitalist world were eliminated.
10. Optimal fiscal policy was co mmonly taught in economic depart ments in Sweden and throughout the world.
11.In recent years there has been a very large debate among political economists and economists in Swedes over whether Sweden actually did so well in the post-war years. It is outside the scope of this paper to evaluate the conflicting claims made in these various econometric arguments. For our purposes two point are necessary. First, at the time (up to t he mid-1970s at least) there was a broad consensus among political and econo mic elites that the Swedish econo my had done rema rka bly well in t he po st-war years. S eco ndly, even the most crit ical analyst s eng aged in t his current debate do not suggest that Sweden did poorly in the 1950s and 1960s, instead they argue that Sweden began to lag in the 1970s and 1980s. cf. (Dowrick 1996; Henrekson 1996; Korpi 1996) .
12. (Moen and Wallerstein 1999: 259) argue that these arguments were probably overstated.
13.These taxes, moreover, were widely spread across the var ious revenue catego ries: The majority of income earners paid marginal income tax rates over 50%, social insurance charges (employers paid) reached over 35%; and the Value Added Tax was quite broadly distributed at a flat rate of 25% on most goods and services. The curious result was a tax system that produced enormous revenues, but was not in itself particularly progressive (Steinmo, 1993: 2).
14.Mo reover, these high tax rat es had been used by finance o fficials in their micro management objectives. It was widely understo od t hat in all but a few isolated cases (ie. t ennis star s, and movie directors) the very rich very rarely paid these super high marginal rates. The tax expenditure system had been designed to allow the big capitalists to retain their wealth holdings as long as they left them in the corporate sector inside Sweden. By the mid 1980's, however, average industrial workers were paying marginal tax rates in excess of 50% of income.
15.Note that in countries with smaller spending needs such as the US, Japan and t he UK, revenues generated from bracket creep could be distribut ed back to t axpayers and/or import ant interest groups (Howard 1997; Steinmo 1993; Witte 1983) . In Sweden, however, the revenue need s of t he st ate were so hig h that litt le co uld in fa ct be t urned ba ck, no matt er how politica lly attractive this may have been.
16. Calmfors, 1977 #1423:531, quoted in Moses, 2000 17.Interview with author, April 2000. 1974-76 and 1980-1990. 19 . (Sjöberg 1999) . Actually the question was What does your heart burn for? ( Vad brinner din hjärte för? ) 20.Some of the more important of these included were included in official public research reports (SOU). (SOU 1984; SOU 1987; SOU 1989a; SOU 1989b ) There were, however, a great deal of other economic analyses co nducted by economists in Sweden which also contribut ed to the reform agenda. Some of these include: (Agell 1986; Bertmar 1983; Hansson and Charles 1990; Jonung 1982; Lindbeck 1983; Lodin 1982; Södersten 1983) 21.See (St einmo 1993: 187) for a list of some o f the reforms introduced in the 1980s. Overall the tax system witnessed several hundred specific changes in this period. 23.Essentially, a two rate personal income tax system was created. All taxpayers paid flat rate local income tax rate (30% in most districts). Income over 74,824 Kronor (approx. $9,500) per year were also subject to the flat rate national income tax of 20%.
18.Feldt was Minister of Finance
24.There were a large number of income tax base broadening measures, certainly the most important of t hese was to eliminat e the de duc tibit y of all interest payment s fro m per sonal inco me tax. Before the reform, this write-off was so tax favorable that a large number of Swedes borrowed money for investment (particularly in real estate) and then deducted the interest. Given tha t almost all Swedes at tha t t ime had marg inal inco me tax rates be tween 5 0 and 80 p erc ent , t his meant that the government effectively paid at least half of the cost of the investment. This cash machine resulted in a net loss in capital income tax revenue to the gover nment (Agell, Berg, and Edin 1995) .
25. Swe den w as in t he mids t o f the most serious recession in po st-war history at t he t ime. T hus it is difficult to specifically evaluate the exact costs of the tax reform. Subsequent analyses, however, suggest that the reform cost the Treasury approximately 3% of GDP (Agell, et. al. 1998 ).
26.By substantially eliminating the deductibility of interest even on owner occupied homes, those who had borrowed to finance purchases now found they could not afford their loans. Given that this occurred inside a general recession, the result was a collapse of the market.
27.GPD actually decreased in 1992, and 1993.
28.Thus, for example, employees were no longer eligible for full pay for up to three days sick leave even when they had no slip from a doctor. A number of similar reforms were reduced as well. Some, of co urse, cause considerable financial hardship in specific public bureaucracies. The health care sector appears to have been particularly hard hit (SOU, 2000: 145-158) .
29.One of the commitments made to the LO during the final negotiations for the reform was that a analysis would be made of the reforms redistributive effects after the reform was introduced.
This rep or t would, the n, be us ed t o guide fut ure tax-spe nding policy.
30. Taxes ha ve t rad itio nally bee n one of the many issues tha t vo ters fe lt were important , but in surveys t aken since 1979 t axes have never been shown to be the most important issue deciding people s votes. Indeed taxes importance is generally dwarfed by specific issues like the environment , ener gy or (in 1982 ) the wa ge earner fu nds. I thank Sören Holmberg , fo r this insight.
31.For example, workers were given 18 months free from work when they had a child (this period could be divided between the man and the woman), workers could take up to 3 days off from
